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LAW AND THE MYTH OF THE SELF 
IN MASS MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS 
by 
RICHARD K. SHERWIN* 
New York Law School 
One evening, not too long ago, I reopened Dante's Inferno. Seduced 
at first by the beauty of the text, I soon found myself outside looking in. 
I became a stranger to Dante's narrative world, cut off from its intricate 
network of eschatological symbols and social allusions. In my world, 
centuries away, Dante's profound faith has devolved into aesthetics. Far 
from Dante's luminous vision of meaning streaming into the mind from 
without, the advent of meaning today has become for the most part an 
affair of the mind alone. 
The great American poet Wallace Stevens has written well of this 
twentieth century shift. In the narrative world of Stevens the passion for 
order may be no less than. it has ever been, but its voice, the timbre of its 
call, has changed. Now we experience the ultimate contingency of order 
through the imagination. As Stevens succinctly wrote, "We say God and 
the imagination are one ... "I 
So pervasive has this experience of meaning's contingency become 
that it has even made a great hit in popular culture. It is popular because 
it is understood. It resonates deeply within our minds. You do not need 
to read Jacques Derrida. You can get it from the movies. Reality there 
can be read off the screen as the product of narrative construction. The 
film viewer can now simultaneously get the story and see its 
construction. In fact, these days, seeing the story's construction is often 
part of the story being told. Postmodernism has become fun, funny - a 
breeze. 
* An earlier version of this essay was presented in Toronto at the 1995 annual 
meeting of the Law & Society Association. This material is adapted from a 
larger work in progress on the relationship between law and popular culture. 
1. From "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour", in Collected Poems of 
Wallace Stevens (New York: Vintage Press, 1959), 158. 
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Take the American hit film Pulp Fiction.2 The characters come at 
you from out of a well-known narrative genre built up from familiar 
scenes and stereotypes: the thugs, the head honcho's moll, the free 
flowing drugs, the graphic violence. It's pulp. We all recognize it as 
such. Indeed, everything we see in the film is experienced as if it were 
wrapped in the thick gauze of that well-worn story type. The fun comes 
when the plot and character-types that we know so well drift in and out 
of our expectations, bringing those very expectations into view. The 
thugs are violent, and indifferent to the pain and death that they deal 
out, as thugs are prone to be. But they are also strangely self-aware, 
articulate - at turns philosophical and bizarre. These are characters 
who can quote scripture one moment and in the next lash out at a friend 
for soiling car upholstery with the blood of an innocent victim.3 
These thugs are like gangster cartoon types anomalously equipped 
with wit, intelligence, and introspection. The mix is strange and 
amusing. When they become violent they do not lose their appeal. For 
we see their violence as part of the pulp genre with which we are already 
familiar. Viewing them through the lens that the genre provides 
insulates us from experiencing their violence as real. In fact, it's even 
comical. We get it: reality is a construct. It is made up of words and 
images that come to us from stories and character types that we know. 
The sense we make of what we hear and see depends on the context. We 
experience meaning through the narrative genres and stereotypes out of 
which words and actions are constructed. Meaning depends upon 
narrative framing. 4 
The law is no stranger to this postmodern ("constructivist") logic. 
For example, we need only recall that it is precisely this logic that 
enabled defence attorneys to reconstruct the meaning of video images 
that fortuitously captured white Los Angeles police officers beating black 
2 Miramax Films, 1993. 
3 &. Philip Meyer has aptly observed, in Pulp Fiction film ·director Quentin 
Tarrantino "suggests a world where the only reality is an agglomeration of 
conversational fragments that allude to a shared pop culture iconography." See 
Philip Meyer, "Desperate for Love 2: Further Analysis of Cinematic Influences 
Upon Closing Arguments to a Jury in a Complex Criminal Case", (manuscript 
on file with the author). 
4 I develop this theme further in a recent article. See Richard K. Sherwin, 
"Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case", 
Stanford Law Review 47 (1994), 39-83. 
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motorist Rodney King. By shifting the context from police aggression to 
self-defence in the face of l(jng's aggression, the defence altered the way 
the jury read the video. Newly digitalized images were choreographed at 
trial in synchrony with the defence theme. Police baton blows, slowed 
sufficiently to lose their violent edge, were now made to follow King's 
movements. The jurors' minds were able to fill in the causal connection: 
when King rose up, police blows followed. 5 Plainly, the police struck in 
reaction to King. He "controlled" the situation, argued the defence. 
And the jurors apparently agreed. They saw the police acting in self- 
defence. 6 
The larger interpretive point being made here can be simply put. 
Seeing is believing, but reality lies in the eye of the beholder. Our beliefs 
help to create what we see. In this sense, Coleridge's notion of the 
reader's necessary "suspension of disbelief'' can no longer be accepted as 
an accurate description of how we experience narrative truth." In fact it 
is just the reverse. Reality emerges out of belief belief in the reality of 
character and plot set within a genre that generates its own discrete 
repertoire of readerly expectations. 8 
In short, belief comes first, and it comes from the story being told. 
5 See Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), 17: "An object moves toward another, makes contact 
with it, and the second object is seen to move in a compatible direction: we see 
causality." 
6 See "The Police Verdict: Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped 
Beating", The New York Times, 30th April 1992, p. l, quoting a juror following 
the verdict: "The cops were simply doing what they'd been instructed to do. 
They were afraid [King] was going to run or even attack them." 
7 See Richard J. Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 201-202: "The classic toggle image comes from Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge's Biograpica Literaria, in which he famously suggested that the 
experience of poetry requires a 'willing suspension of disbelief." According to 
Gerrig (ibid.), "There is little evidence ... that readers can alter beliefs in any 
important sense by acts of will." 
8 According to Gerrig (Ibid., at 230), "comprehension alone leads to belief in 
the veracity of a statement." See also Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 60: "[T[he historian must 
draw upon a fund of culturally provided mythoi in order to constitute the facts 
as figuring a story of a particular kind, just as he must appeal to that same fund 
of mythoi in the minds of readers to endow his account of the past with the 
odour of meaning or significance." 
302 RICHARD K. SHERWIN 
Disbelief will follow, if at all, only after we've taken the story in. 
Disbelief is harder than belief. It requires more effort. For disbelief to 
occur we must first critically confront what we already know, what we 
have already understood. As Spinoza recognized early on, understanding 
presupposes something already understood. 9 We believe what we 
understand. When we step back from that understanding, subjecting 
what we know to critical reflection, perhaps then we may come to reject 
our knowledge as false. Or perhaps not, for it may be that we never 
come to suspend at least some of our narrative beliefs and expectations. 
In any event, it is these beliefs and expectations that shape and inform 
our sense of narrative truth. From these sources knowledge and 
understanding are made possible. IO 
Films like Pulp Fiction and trials like the Rodney King case are not 
the only evidence of a broad-based, popular understanding of the 
narrative construction of reality. We see it in a number of successful 
films and TV shows as well as in other popular trials. The Canadian 
film director Atom Egoyan expressed it well when he said in an interview 
about his most recent film, Exotica: "What's so exciting about film 
making [is] the way people piece together what they need ... to fill in 
their own expectations." 11 
I want to take up here this notion of making stories out of people's 
needs and expectations. My objective is to use this idea as a bridge that 
will take us from the narrative construction of reality in popular culture 
to its construction as a matter of law. For it is my claim that building 
stories out of people's needs and expectations is precisely what good 
American trial lawyers do in practice. The stories they tell in court tap 
into and hold on to jurors' pre-existing beliefs and expectations - 
9· . See Gerrig, supra n.7, at 227, noting that, according to the Dutch 
philosopher Baruch Spinoza, "the acceptance of belief is an automatic 
concomitant of comprehension," and that the "unacceptance" of belief "may 
follow later, but the initial product of ordinary cognitive processing is a belief in 
the understood proposition." In short, before a stage of unacceptance, all 
information would be taken as true. 
1 
O For further analysis of this proposition in the context of law, see Sherwin, 
"Law Frames", supra n.4. 
l l See John Anderson, "A Filmmaker Who Plays With Expectations," New 
York Newsday B3 (7th March 1995). See generally Richard K. Sherwin, "The 
Narrative Construction of Legal Reality", Vermont Law Review 18 (1994), 681- 
719. 
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including their beliefs and expectations about what constitutes a good 
story and what kind of story plays best under what circumstances. 
Of course for trial lawyers, unlike film makers perhaps, it is not 
simply a question of satisfying the audience's need for meaning or drama 
or catharsis. Trial lawyers need to stimulate in their audience the felt 
need for a particular kind of story. Which is another way of saying they 
have to activate the right set of expectations - the one that will win the 
case. 12 
Thus we may ask, what are the particular beliefs and expectations 
that particular legal story genres rely on? 
Consider in this regard our expectations regarding that persistent, 
well-known and well-loved genre of storytelling known as the detective 
story. This kind of story typically features an investigator's ingenious, 
albeit straightforward, logic-driven marshalling of clues culminating in 
the discovery of objective truth. It is premised on an expectation of 
closure and finality.13 The detective story typically takes us along a 
causally sequential path ending with certainty, for in the end we know 
"who done it," who is to blame. Such knowledge is often accompanied 
by a sense of inevitability. As if to say, "If one were but to look at the 
12 See, e.g., Michael E. Tigar, Examining Wz'tnesses (Chicago: American Bar 
Association, 1993), 5: "People, including judges and jurors, understand and 
restate events in terms of stories. They take the available evidence and weave it 
into a coherent whole. If pieces are missing, they will fill in the gaps based on 
intuition, probability, or prejudgment ... " 
13 See generally Sherwin, "Law Frames", supra n.4. All those litigators and 
jurors who at one time were beguiled viewers of that brilliant TV trial attorney, 
Perry Mason, know that in the final moment of artful cross-examination the 
confession will come and truth will dissolve any antecedent mystery. See 
remarks by Jeremiah Donovan in the "Lawyers as Storytellers Symposium" 
(transcript on file with Vermont Law Review). See also Tzvetan Todorov, 
Introduction to Poetics (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesoata Press, 1981), 41 
("Most works of fiction of the past are organized according to an order that we 
may qualify as both temporal and logical; let us add at once that the logical 
relation we habitually think of is implication, or as we ordinarily say, 
causality."); Herbert Morris, "Decline of Guilt", Ethics 99 (1988), 62-76, at 69 
("Among law's clearest lessons are that norms exist and that they are to be taken 
seriously. These in turn provide reassurance that our social world is orderly and 
not chaotic. That it is a structured space in which not everything is permitted, 
where there are limits to conduct, a role for rational argumentation who has 
crossed these limits, and, equally important psychologically, that closure exists 
as a possibility once these limits have been breached."). 
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matter closely enough, the truth shall emerge. It is but awaiting 
detection." l4 In this respect, the detective story may be said to represent 
a popular version of the long dominant "logico-scienrific" genre. l5 The 
world according to this genre is one in which logic makes its demands 
and reality complies. Whether we desire it to be so or not is quite beside 
the point, for surely objective reality cares not a whit for human wishes 
and feelings. We must accept things as they are. We must accept what 
is. At least, that is the familiar posture in which one finds oneself when 
one is in the grip of this kind of explanatory narrative genre. In the 
logico-scientific detective story the audience is typically cast in the role of 
. objective observer, with a view of reality that is both dispassionate and 
fixed. Faced with what has been shown to be the case, one accepts. 
Prosecutors in criminal cases can be quite fond of this classically 
modernist story form. 16 It comports nicely with their burden of proof, 
to demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And it carries a solid 
psychological insight. Cast into a world of objective truth, where 
deductive and inductive logic dictate concrete results, jurors may more 
readily accept their fate: to confirm what has already occurred, and to 
apply the rules that govern legal outcomes in such situations. Passivity 
before truth and law's mandate, letting the judgment that must come 
come, is a classic (although by no means exclusive) formula for prosecut - 
orial success. 
Consider, for example, the prosecution's closing arguments in the 
recent O.J. Simpson double murder case. Prosecutors Marcia Clark and 
Christopher Darden laid out a classic linear-causal, logic-driven 
14 
It may be that one of the great functions of the law is to propagate a 
continued belief in certitude and closure so that justice may be done. See 
Herbert Morris, supra n.13. This is, perhaps, jhe legal profession's own "noble 
lie", according to which the truth (of uncertainty) must be suppressed for the 
sake of a greater truth (the possibility of justice). On scapegoating, see generally 
Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1977). 
l5 This is Bruner's term. See Actual Minds, supra n.5, at 12. Bruner also 
makes reference to the historical-causal sequence story. See also Bruner, "The 
Narrative Construction of Reality", Critical!nquiry 18 (Autumn 1991), 19, and 
Carlo Ginzburg, "Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm", in Clues, Myths, and 
the Historical Method, ed. Carlo Ginzburg (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1989), 106-117, referring to the Galilean method. 
16 
See Anthony G. Amsterdam and Randy Hertz, "An Analysis of Closing 
Arguments to a Jury", New York Law School Law Review 37 (1992), 55-122. 
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narrative. Theirs was a plea for "calm and reason". 17 They implored the 
jury not to make any "quantum leaps in logic." l8 And they frequently 
contrasted the "fiery rhetoric" of the defence with their own reliance 
upon logic and reason. 19 
For the prosecutors emotion was considered a distraction, anathema 
to the "objective" judgment that they were seeking from the jury. 20 
Logic was their watchword throughout the summations. And the final 
image with which they ended their address to the jury offers as fine an 
emblem of the logic-driven detective story as one is likely to find. It is 
the image of a jigsaw puzzle. There before the jury, projecting from an 
oversized television screen, are the pieces of the puzzle clicking into 
place. Each piece coincides with an element of the state's case: 
Simpson's opportunity to kill (click), his motive (click), the blood trail 
that he left at the scene of the crime (click), the victim's blood on his 
socks and glove (click), the victim's fibers on his knit cap (click), the 
actual glove that he wore during the murders (click), the personal style of 
the killing (click). Until, finally, all the pieces are in place, and there on 
the screen looms the completed picture: it is a picture of O.J. Simpson. 
The jurors' task, therefore, is obvious: all they need to do is add up 
the pieces. Logic, in the face of objective reality, will dictate the result. 
Once the truth has emerged, the jurors have no choice: they must 
comply with the law's command. 
Of course jurors may also be led to reject the classically passive role 
in which prosecutors often cast them. Rather than being ruled by fixity 
(being bound by manifest reality) and closure (following the law's 
mandate), jurors may instead be induced to enter a world of dramatic 
possibility and openness. At any rate, there is a good chance that this is 
the kind of world that the defence' s story will seek to conjure. 21 This 
type of story lacks logico-scientific precision. Instead, it depicts a world 
filled with contingencies, uncertainties, the stuff of human drama. The 
world that it presupposes is psychologically in process, what cognitive 
17 See trial transcript, 27th September 1995, at 248. All references to the 
attorneys' summations in the Simpson case were obtained from the Lexis-Nexis 
service's "unedited and non-certified" transcript of the trial. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., at 50. 
20 Ibid., at 68. 
21 See Amsterdam and Hertz, supra n.16. 
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psychologist Jerome Bruner calls subjunctivized reality. 22 In such a 
world, jurors are likely to feel compelled to rely upon their own world 
knowledge in order to fill in gaps that the defence stoty leaves open. 
They will also reach into their own stock of emotional resources to 
animate the story being told. The jurors' inherited cultural knowledge 
and emotional repertoire will be deliberately triggered by the familiar 
images, stock scripts, and predictable scenarios that defence counsel uses 
during the course of the trial, particularly during the opening and 
dosing statements to the jury. The jurors' investment of their own 
knowledge and emotional energy will also serve as an additional source 
of authority for the story in which they are investing. For how can they 
quarrel with what their own life experience tells them about the world?23 
In direct contrast then to the prosecution's passivity-inducing, logic- 
driven ("detection") narrative, the defence wants the jurors to know that 
this is their story too. They have the final say in how the case shall be 
resolved. Nothing is necessitated from without: neither by objective 
reality, nor by some impersonal ("logical") force. 24 Instead, it is now the 
22 
See Bruner, supra n.S, at 25-26, referring to subjunctification as "the 
depiction of reality not through an omniscient eye that views a timeless reality, 
but through the filter of consciousness of the protagonists in the story.") 
According to Bruner (at 26), "To be in the subjunctive mode is, then, to be 
trafficking in human possibilities rather than in settled certainties." 
It is important to note that while Bruner seems quite right to distinguish "a 
good story" from "a well-formed argument", especially with respect to their 
respective procedures for verification, in legal practice argument and storytelling 
often share a complex set of interactions. For example, a story at trial can tell 
jurors how to use argument in a given case. A fuller analysis of this complex 
process, however, would take us well beyond the scope of this essay. See 
William Twining, "Anchored Narratives - A Comment", European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal justice 1 ( 1995), 106-114, at 111 (astutely 
noting the need, in the context of advocacy and adjudication, to clarify the 
respective roles of stories and arguments in the theory of evidence). 
23 
See Gerrig, supra n.Z, at 13, noting that according to the principle of 
"minimal departure" people reconstrue fictional narrative worlds as being the 
closest possible to the reality that they know. This means that we tend to 
project upon the world of the statement everything we know about the real 
world, and that we will make only those adjustments which we cannot avoid. 
24 Compare, for example, Justice Blackmun's empathic and emotional 
narrative, in his dissent in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), with Justice Rehnquist's imperative, syllogistic 
interpretation of relevant case law. According to Justice Rehnquist: "[N]othing 
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jurors themselves who are empowered to realize the kind of self and 
social reality that the defence narrative holds out. It is up to them, 
however, to seize the possibility of becoming, by their own action (i.e., 
by "doing the right thing"), the heroes they aspire to be in a world of 
values they wish to affirm. 
The O.J. Simpson trial provides an excellent illustration of the 
dramatic hero role that the defence often will assign to jurors. Notably, 
in the Simpson defence's view, the jury decisionmaking process is not a 
simple matter of passive fact detection or a matter of simply gazing back 
into the past. It is far more active, more present and future-oriented, 
than that. To be sure, it is not the simple task that prosecutor 
Christopher Darden had in mind for the jurors when he told them: 
"This case really is a simple case when you get down to the bottom 
line ... [A]ll you have to do is use your common sense."25 Indeed, it 
turns out that within the heroic genre being tapped by the defence, the 
jurors themselves are among the main protagonists in a story that is 
unfolding in real time within the courtroom itself. 26 As defence counsel 
Johnny Cochran repeatedly put it, the jurors are on "a journey toward 
justice", 27 and it is they who will determine what destination will be 
reached by trial's end. 
This is no ordinary voyage. It is a heroic quest. As the defence 
notes, others have joined in this quest, such as Frederick Douglas, over a 
hundred years ago, who fought as a former slave against the evils of 
slavery and racism in America. 28 These are the jurors' forebears and 
comrades in the heroic struggle against what Cochran repeatedly referred 
to at trial as "genocidal racism" - a phrase that Cochran used in 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to 
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private 
actors." In contrast, Justice Blackmun states: "Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated 
attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and 
abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and 
who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except, 
as this Court revealingly observes, ante, at 193, 'dutifully recorded these 
incidents in [their] files." 
25 See trial transcript at 221. 
26 See Amsterdam and Hertz, supra n.16. 
27 See trial transcript at 68. 
28 See trial transcript at 82. 
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particular to describe the views of the state's star witness, Los Angeles 
police officer Mark Fuhrman. Fuhrman's overtly racist views toward 
blacks and mixed race couples were an important part of the defence's 
evidentiary record at trial. Indeed, Fuhrman himself came to symbolize 
the official corruption and abuse of power that targeted the defendant in 
the first place. 29 
It is from this diverse cast of allies and enemies that the jurors were 
to gauge their own self-identity and moral stature in the struggle taking 
place in court, and in the nation at large. For as the defence repeatedly 
reminded them, these jurors, and perhaps they alone, were empowered 
to change the current state of affairs in the country. It was up to them 
to undo the injustices stemming from state racism and abuse of 
power - if the jurors had the courage and the fortitude to realize their 
ideals and principles. 30 As Cochran exhorted during his summation: 
29 Throughout the defence team's opening arguments, the state was 
condemned for its "rush to judgment". According to the defence, the state 
"targeted" O.J. Simpson without pursuing any other possible suspects. The 
prosecutors and the Los Angeles police department were swept into the 
defence's story of a quasi-conspiratorial, race-based "scapegoating" of Simpson. 
Much could, and no doubt will, be said about the Simpson defence team's 
manipulation of juror anger against the state and the strategy of triggering anger 
as a way of eclipsing the jurors' reliance on fact-based, truth-oriented 
argumentation. The defence objective apparently was to defuse, or bypass 
altogether, if possible, the jurors' tension-filled task of repudiating O.J. Simpson 
qua local folk hero. To accomplish this would require substituting such an 
unpleasant task with a more personally uplifting one, namely: the task of 
fulfilling a higher form of (symbolic) justice. In shore, for the sake of a larger, 
case-transcending goal - justice in a society riven by racism and official 
corruption - the jurors could avoid the cognitive dissonance that would stem 
from tearing down a widely admired figure. Adopting the defence perspective, 
jurors could actually preserve Simpson's heroic identity, or at least the jurors' 
experience of identifying with the heroic values that Simpson might personally 
embody for them, by displacing that sense of heroism onto others. In this 
instance, those others turned out to be defence lawyer Johnny Cochran and the 
jurors themselves. The task of mourning the loss of the fallen idol could thus be 
avoided. 
30 This is not the only time lawyers have placed jurors in a grandiose role. 
See, e.g., Laura Hanft Korobkin, "The Maintenance of Mutual Confidence: 
Sentimental Strategies at the Adultery Trial of Henry Ward Beecher", Yak 
Journal of Law and the Humanities 7 (Winter 1995), 1-48, at 16, noting that 
jurors at this infamous trial, which stretched on from 1874 through 1875, were 
told that their deepest personal, cultural, and religious values were somehow at 
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"You are empowered to say we are not going to take [police abuse of 
power and racism] anymore ... You have the authority ... Please don't 
compromise your principles ... don't rush to judgment. Don't 
compound what [the state has] already done in this case."31 
In short, it was up to the jury, by their judgment in this particular 
case, to set justice straight. The state's abuses - their reliance upon 
racist police officers like Mark Fuhrman and their proffering of tainted 
evidence in court - could only be checked by the jurors' heroic action. 
Surely this is a far cry from the passive role that the state would have the 
jurors play. To fulfil the defence's challenge would require principled 
commitment. The jurors must ask themselves: "Was I naive? Was I 
timid? Or was I courageous? Did I believe in the Constitution? Did I 
believe in justice? Did I do my part for integrity and honesty?"32 
Notably, it is only by a verdict of acquittal that the jurors can realize the 
heroic identity that the defence holds out for them. As Johnny Cochran 
put it: "In a society where many people are apathetic" 33 it is up to the 
jurors to act: "You are the ones who made a commitment, a commit- 
ment toward justice, but you got to see it through ... If you don't stop it 
[i.e., the state's cover-up] then who? Do you think the police depart- 
ment is going to stop it? Do you think we can stop it by ourselves? It 
has to be stopped by you . . . You police the police through your 
verdict ... You are the ones in war, you are the ones who are on the front 
line ... " 34 
Thus do we see the defence wrapping the jurors into an encompas- 
sing heroic drama in which they too serve as protagonists. It is a drama 
that began long before O.J. Simpson was unfairly targeted by racist 
police officers. And it is a drama that continues to unfold at trial. In 
short, the drama being narrated by the defence involves the defendant, 
stake in the courtroom and that "strangers from distant climes" would one day 
make pilgrimages to the courtroom to see the place "from which was given back 
to the world freed from cloud or passing shadow, the name of Henry Ward 
Beecher.". Compare Johnny Cochran's words to the Simpson jury: "Your 
verdict in this case will go far beyond the walls of department I 03 because your 
verdict talks about justice in America." Transcript at 47. 
31 28th September 1995, transcript at 75. 
32 Ibid., at 68. 
33 Ibid., at 74. 
34 Ibid., at 76. 
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but it also goes well beyond him. Indeed, according to the defence's 
narrative, the jurors as well must confront the same evils and dangers 
presented by a racist state. What is more, only' they have the power to 
save themselves along with O.J. Simpson and other oppressed minorities 
from this kind of official abuse of power. 
In the end, according to the Simpson defence team's narrative, the 
mystery underlying the deaths of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron 
Goldman may remain, which is to say that the truth may not have been 
detected after all. But in the defence view, this is no cause for regret. 
For there is, they suggest, an even greater prize to be won than truth. It 
is the prize of justice. By this reasoning, the defence comes close to 
inviting the jury not only not to obey, but actually to nullify the law's 
command. 35 For to do otherwise would be to participate in the state's 
own corrupted processes. 36 As to the uncertainty this leaves with respect 
35 Compare Alexander Hamilton's closing argument to the jury in the 1735 
libel trial of John Peter Zenger: 
The power is in your hands, gentlemen, to safeguard our liberties. If you 
should be of the opinion that there is no falsehood in Mr. Zenger's papers, 
you will, nay, you ought to say so ... [You must] support liberry, the only 
bulwark against lawless power. Nature and the laws of our country have 
given us a right - the liberty - both of exposing arbitrary power ... by 
speaking and writing truth. 
(cited in William Kunstler, My Life as a Radical Lawyer (New York: Carol 
Publishers, 1994), 191), with Johnny Cochran's closing argument in the 
Simpson case: 
Now, it is your time to perform ... We are going to watch you work and 
watching you work is what makes this country so great. Because it is rwelve 
citizens good and true coming together from this community from 
disparate backgrounds, experience not required, citizenship, the only 
requirement to do justice, to do right, to right some wrongs, to straighten 
this out ... 
(28th September 1995, transcript at 23). 
36 As Johnny Cochran told the jurors in his closing argument: "You and I, 
fighting for freedom and ideals and for justice for all, must continue to fight to 
expose hate and genocidal racism and these tendencies. We then become the 
guardians of the Constitution ... " (ibid., at 182). 
Ironically, a similar rationale may be found in the Supreme Court's 
constitutional jusitification for precluding even truthful evidence from trial if it 
has been obtained in violation of due process. The difference is that in the 
Simpson case we have an example of bottom-up ("popular") constitutionalism, 
rather than the high court's top-down authorization of process values over truth 
values. Compare Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (opposing 
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to truth (who done it?) this may be overcome by closure of a different 
sort. It is the closure that comes with the heroic affirmation of what is 
right, acting for a greater good, a higher value or ideal than truth. It 
comes with doing justice. In sum, for the Simpson defence to have its 
way, the prosecution's mystery genre ("find the truth!") must be trumped 
by the heroic genre ("do justice!'). 
Of course each side is right, albeit each in its own way. For what is a 
trial, at least in the Anglo-American common law tradition, but a contest 
between conflicting narrative accounts, including conflicting genres, 
story lines, and character types?37 Because the stakes at trial are high the 
temptation is strong to objectivize truth. The more subjective one's 
judgment the greater one's sense of responsibility. And the greater one's 
sense of personal responsibility the greater is the weight of individual 
decisionmaking. If that responsibility can be made to ride upon the 
shoulders of what truth and law demand it follows that the weight on 
the individual juror-decisionmaker will be lessened. After all, it is simply 
"the Truth" or "what law demands" that is at stake. What can one do? 
The decisionmaker's hands are tied. The burden lies elsewhere. 
Trial lawyers know how to play off of jurors' sensitivity to the 
responsibilities of decisionmaking. Prosecutors with a '.'just the facts, 
ma'am" storytelling style38 typically strive to objectify reality and make 
judgment passive (asking jurors to "discover" the truth and obey the 
law's mandate), in order to minimize the juror's burden. But this 
strategy also carries a price. It risks telling a legal story that falls flat in 
court. Prosecutors in the recent Rodney King and O.J. Simpson cases 
ended up paying that price. Unlike the historically accurate, but 
convictions based on coerced confessions - not because the confessions thus 
obtained were untrue, but because "the methods used to extract them offend an 
underlying principle in the enforcement of criminal law: that ours is an 
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.") with Robert Cover, "The Bonds 
of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role", 
Georgia Law Review 20 (1986), 815-833, at 832-33 ("The citizen or dissenter's 
constitutional interpretation cannot be less the deed than that of the state's 
officials. If the officials of the state realize their vision in blood, the dissenter 
must also either suffer or impose a parallel form of violence."). 
37 See Sherwin, "The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality", supra n.11. 
38 See Kim Lane Scheppele, "Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, 
Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth", New York Law School Law 
Review 37 (1992), 123-172. 
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dramatically weak "chronicle" genre, the defence more often seeks 
actively to engage the jurors in a heroic drama. By inviting such a 
participatory stance toward events and cultural themes that are being 
played out in court, the defence may shift the jurors' focus. Instead of 
uncovering "objective" truth and "dispassionately" (or logically) applying 
to it the law's command, jurors may now be more apt to probe the 
underlying motives and intent of the accused. There is also greater 
incentive to go beyond the surface of events, to see a larger social and 
cultural canvas - including the kind of self and social reality that one 
may create by opting for one particular narrative construction rather 
than another. Of course the characteristic danger for the defence in this 
effort is that their drama may be overplayed. When that happens, the 
drama falls upon the courtroom stage as deflated, empty rhetoric. 
The specific legal stories that I discuss more fully in what follows 
will, I hope, make plain the complex inter-connection between law and 
popular storytelling. While this cross-fertilization between legal and 
popular culture is certainly not a new phenomenon, 39 I believe that it 
has become more prominent in recent years due to the profound impact 
of visual mass media, particularly film and television, on the way that we 
see and think about ourselves, others, and the world around us. 
Mass media stories connect up with the law in at least two different 
ways. First, trial lawyers often draw upon familiar mass media stories in 
order to tap into popular notions about the way things and people are in 
the world. As a couple of clever advertising executives once said: "To be 
successful today, you must touch base with reality. And the reality that 
really counts is what's already in the prospect's mind."40 Since a good 
deal of what fills people's heads these days comes from the mass 
media - from newspapers, magazines, film, and television - it is not 
surprising to find lawyers drawing stories from these sources. 
In addition to using mass media stories to work off of a jury's pre- 
existing beliefs and expectations, however, there is at least one other use. 
39 For examples of notorious, highly "mediatized" trials from the last century, 
see Andie Tucher, Froth and Scum: Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and the Ax Murder 
in America's First Mass Medium (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1994); Robert Ferguson, "Story and Transcription in the Trial of John 
Brown", Yale journal of Law & the Humanities 6 (1994), 37-73; Korobkin, 
supra n.30. 
40 Al Ries and Jack Trout, Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1986, rev'd ed.), 5. 
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Lawyers also tap into mass media stories for external consumption, going 
beyond the courtroom. For example, trial lawyers may seek to emulate 
the way in which mass media stories are told so that the lawyer's story 
can be quickly told again by the mass media. In this way, trial lawyers 
may reinforce their message with the added weight of the electronic 
medium to which their message has been adapted. This is not simply a 
matter of skirting the storytelling constraints of trial by going public. It 
is also a matter of translating one's message into a medium of choice. 
For example, in the case of television, this means deliberately creating 
captivating visuals and snappy sound bites. 41 
This external use of mass media is often exploited by lawyers 
handling political cases, or cases that they would like to be regarded as 
political cases. Here the public is often used as a kind of "meta-jury" to 
keep tabs on the trial itself. Since the violent aftermath of the first 
Rodney King trial, this external use of media stories has become rather 
familiar. Few American TV viewers (which means few Americans) will 
soon forget the mass rioting that erupted in central Los Angeles after 
twelve Simi valley jurors acquitted the officers accused of assaulting 
Rodney King. Nor will they forget the outcome of the Reginald Denny 
trial that followed shortly thereafter. The Denny case involved a violent 
assault captured live by a television news camera. The images graphically 
showed a black defendant beating white motorist Denny on the head, at 
one point with the aid of a brick. As in the Rodney King case, these 
explicit images also failed to secure a conviction. 42 
At the Denny trial, the defendant claimed, successfully, that he had 
been caught up in the spirit of the rioting that erupted in response to the 
acquitta] of the Los Angeles police officers in the King case. The pall of 
racial injustice that hung over the city, and the nation, following the 
King verdict was palpable. The Denny verdict was perhaps a way for 
citizens to lift that shroud (what others might call "evening the score"). 
In any event, this outcome suggests what those in the mass media 
already know: video images are not objective sources of knowledge about 
41 Consider in this regard Johnny Cochran's battery of easy-to-retain slogans 
in his summation at the Simpson trial: "Be fair. Don't be a part of this 
continuing cover-up. Do the right thing, remembering that if it doesn't fit, you 
must acquit, that if these messengers have lied to you, you can't trust their 
message" (29th September 1995, transcript at 39). . 
42 It is interesting to note that Simpson defence attorney Johnny Cochran also 
represented the defendant in the Reginald Denny case. 
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the world.43 The Denny case outcome also suggests that the judgment 
of jurors in highly publicized cases, like the King, Denny, and Simpson 
cases, is likely to enter into the domain of larger public issues. As a 
result, these jurors are unlikely to be indifferent to the mass media's 
framing of the issues involved. From this perspective, it is hardly 
surprising to hear echoes of the King case, and concomitantly the threat 
of a similarly violent aftermath, resonate within Johnny Cochran's 
defence summation in the O.J. Simpson case. 44 
In the remaining part of this essay I wish to illustrate internal (in- 
court) and external (out-of-court) uses of mass media representations. I 
will do so by drawing upon two well-known American criminal trials. 
First, the 1969 trial of the Chicago Seven: a case involving defendants 
who were indicted for crossing state lines with the intention of causing a 
riot. By way of context-setting, at the time of their arrest, 1968, in 
Chicago, the Democratic party's presidential convention was under way. 
The acrimonious divisions inside the convention hall were mirrored on 
the streets of the city. This was, after all, a time when the Vietnam war 
was splitting the country into two increasingly hostile opposing camps. 
The second trial that I want to discuss took place in 1977. This case 
involved capital murder charges against Randall Dale Adams for 
shooting a Dallas police officer. Adams was convicted and sentenced to 
death in the electric chair, but ultimately freed in the aftermath of an 
alleged "documentary" film45 which persuasively established that Adams 
had been framed. 
Both of these trials demonstrate the deliberate and calculated use of 
mass media representations to construct legal realities, including the 
reality of self. In both cases we see stock scripts, familiar story lines, and 
classic character types being lifted from pop cultural narratives and 
purveyed inside the courtroom for consumption by the jury. We also 
see similar pop narrative representations being purveyed from inside the 
43 See Charles Hagen, "The Power of a Video Image Depends on the 
Caption", The New York Times, l Oth May 1992, 32, noting that "photographic 
images of all sorts remain essentially ambiguous, and must be anchored in a 
convincing narrative before they take on a specific meaning" and that "most 
images can be made to fit into a number of widely disparate narratives." 
44 See, e.g., Johnny Cochran's comment in dosing argument: "Thank heaven 
we have videotape ... [W]e know in this city how important videotapes can be 
when people don't want to believe things ... " (Trial transcript at 178). 
45 Errol Morris's The Thin Blue Line (Third Floor Productions, 1988). 
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courtroom to the world outside through the mass media, for 
consumption by the public at large. 
The specific questions I want to address are: How were mass media 
stories used in these cases to construct the identity of the protagonists at 
trial? And how did the emulation of mass media storytelling 
techniques - for example, the deliberate use of mass media story- 
bites - shape the public's understanding of these trials and of the reality 
that they depicted? 
The Chicago Seven Trial 
Defendant Tom Hayden wrote of the trial: "Our crime was our 
identity ... The vague nature of the government's case made us feel we 
were on trial for something deeper and unspoken."46 In response, the 
defence used techniques of self-dramatization and counter-cultural 
rnythification to dramatize its case. In effect, the trial became theatre: 
with the prosecutors and judge cast as fossilized, arbitrary, and violent 
agents of the state, while the defendants were to appear as lively, playful, 
and erotic free spirits. The defence team mobilized for the trial the icons 
of pop culture. Singers Ario Guthrie, Judy Collins, and Pete Seeger 
testified, as did writers Allen Ginsberg, William Burroughs, and Norman 
Mailer. 
The defendants' dress and antics and discourse throughout the trial 
also replicated countercultural images and stories of identity. For 









Will you please identify yourself for the record? 
- My name is Abbie. I am an orphan of America. 
Where do you reside? 
I live in Woodstock Nation. 
Will you tell the Court and jury where it is? 
Yes. It is nation of alienated young people. We 
carry it around with us as a state of mind in the 
same way as the Sioux Indians carried the Sioux 
nation around with them. 
J use where it is, that is all. 
It is in my mind and in the minds of my brothers 
46 Tom Hayden, Trial (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), 29. 
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The Court: 
and sisters. 
No, we want the place of residence in what state 
is Woodstock? 
It is in the state of mind. 41 The Witness: 
Playfulness and surrealist humour permeate the trial transcript. For 
example, consider this exchange in court: 
The Court: The remarks of the witness may go out and the 
jury is directed to disregard them. 
Where do they go when they go out?48 The Witness: 
* * * 
Kunstler: Your Honour, ifl could make one application - 
the other seven defendants have purchased a 
birthday cake for Chairman Bobby Seale. 
Mr. Kunstler, I won't even let anybody bring me 
a birthday cake. 
Your application will be denied. 




Mr. Rennie Davis: 
* * * 
Ass't U.S. Atty. Schultz: If the Court please, I would ask the Court again 
if he would direct the marshals to direct the 
defendants and their lawyers to stop laughing out 
loud. 
But your Honour, we are human beings, too. 
You can't make automatons out of us, or robots; 
we are human beings and we laugh occasionally, 
and if it come irrepressibly, I don't really see how 
that really becomes a court matter. 
Mr. Kunstler is laughing so he can influence the 
jury with the impression that this is absurd. 
Kunstler: 
Mr. Schultz: 
47 The Conspiracy Trial [hereinafter "transcript"] (ed. by Judy Clavir and John 
Spitzer) (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1970), 344 (testimony of defendant Abbie 
Hoffman). 
48 Transcript at 349 [testimony of defendant Abbie Hoffman]. 
49 Transcript at 122 [testimony of defendant Rennie Davis]. 
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The Witness: 
That is why he is laughing aloud.50 
* * * 
I want to comply with Mr. Schultz's request to 
do a head stand in court, if he wants to see me do 
it. I think it might start a riot.51 
And when goaded into playing its contrasting "authoritarian" role, the 
state complied. Consider, for example, Judge Julius Hoffman's orders 
that defendant Bobby Seale (then chairman of the militant Black 
Panther party) be gagged and bound to his chair inside the courtroom: 
Now they are going to beat him, they are going 
to beat him. 
You may as well kill him if you are going to gag 
him. It seems that way, doesn't it? 
You are not permitted to address the Court, Mr. 
Hoffman. You have a lawyer. 
Abbie Hoffman: This isn't a court. This is a neon oven. 
Ass't U.S. Atty. Foran: That was the defendant Hoffman who spoke. 
Ass't U.S. Atty. Schultz: Prior to that it was Mr. Hayden who was 
addressing the jury while they were walking out 
of here. 
Mr. Tom Hayden: 
Abbie Hoffman: 
The Court: 
Mr. Tom Hayden: 
Abbie Hoffman: 
Mr. Dellinger: 
50 Transcript at 207 
Kunsder]. 
51 
I was not addressing the jury. I was trying to 
protect Mr. Seale. A man is supposed to be silent 
when he sees another man's nose being smashed? 
The disruption started when these guys got into 
overkill. It is the same thing as last year in 
Chicago, the same exact thing.52 
* * * 
There's no pretence of fairness in this court. All 
you're doing is employing a riot - employing 
force and violence to try to keep me quiet. Just 
like you gagged Bobby Seale because you 
[in-court statement by defence attorney William 
Transcript at 371 [testimony of defendant Abbie Hoffman]. 
52 Transcript at 169 [in-court statement by defendant Abbie Hoffman]. 
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Marshal Joneson: 
Mr. Dellinger: 
couldn't afford to listen to the truth that he was 
saying to you. You're accusing me. I'm a 
pacifist. 
Sit down, please, and be quiet. 
I am employing nonviolence, and you're accusing 
me of violence, and you have a man right here, 
backed up by guns, jails, and force and violence. 
That is the difference between us. 53 
The state's efforts to discredit the counterculture's embrace of overt 
sexuality made particularly vivid the split between the parties. For 
example, on cross-examination the prosecutor takes American Beat poet 
Allen Ginsberg to task for an explicit reference in one of his poems to 
homosexual love. The poem begins with a line from Walt Whitman: 
''I'll go into the bedroom silently and lie down between the bridegroom 
and the bride/those bodies fallen from heaven stretched out waiting 
naked and restless ... " 54 
There can be little doubt that the state was seeking here to taint the 
defendants in the eyes of the jury by provoking a homophobic response 
to Whitman's and Ginsberg's poetry. For their part, the defence had 
Ginsberg recite the opening lines from his great 1956 poem, "Howl": "I 
saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness ... " 55 
By the time Ginsberg leaves the stand we see the defendants moved 
to tears, and we hear the prosecutor mutter, "Damn fag". 56 
According to Tom Hayden, co-defendants Abbie Hoffman and Jerry 
Rubin "wanted to create the image of a courtroom in shambles ... Part of 
the Yippie genius is to manipulate the fact that the media will always 
53 Transcript at 468 [testimony of defendant Dave Dellinger). See Tom 
Hayden, Trial, supra n.46, at 49: "Putting our identity on trial caused our 
prosecutors to expose their own." 
54 Transcript at 305-306 (quoting a line from Whitman in Ginsberg's poem, 
"Love Poem on Theme by Whitman"). 
55 See Hayden, Trial, supra n.46, at 38-39. The full first line of the poem 
runs: "I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving, 
hysterical, naked, dragging themselves through the Negro streets at dawn 
looking for an angry fix." (from Howl and Other Poems [1956)). 
56 Hayden, supra n.46, at 39. See also David J. Danelski, "The Chicago 
Conspiracy Trial", in Political Trials, ed. Theodore L. Becker (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 166. 
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emphasize the bizarre. Even the straightest reporter will communicate 
chaos because it sells. The Yippies know this because their politics 
involve consciously marketing themselves as mythic personality models 
for kids."57 And in fact defendants Hoffman and Rubin spent much of 
their courtroom time analyzing trial coverage by the media: plotting 
press conferences, arranging for Yippie witnesses to get on the stand in 
time for the deadlines - what we all recognize today as the art of spin 
control.58 
In short, the Chicago 1 trial became a spectacle in which defendants 
and their attorneys deliberately drew upon popular cultural stories and 
images for internal and external consumption - to goad the trial judge 
and to persuade the jury and the public at large that the forces of 
playfulness and life-affirmation were on trial against forces of fear and 
repression. What we see here are defendants, particularly Abbie 
Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, manipulating reality, much like Pulp Fiction 
director Quentin T arrantino, by shrewdly playing off of popular cultural 
iconography. The defendants internalized pop cultural constructs 
precisely in order to project back into the public domain specific 
countercultural ideals, symbols, and rhetoric. Their objective was to 
simultaneously enhance their own popularity, as media celebrities, and 
to cultivate the support necessary for their exoneration at trial. 
57 Tom Hayden, supra n.46, at 69 ("For Abbie and Jerry ... the courtroom 
was a new theatre, perhaps a purer kind of theatre than anything in previous 
Yippie [Youth International Party] history."). 
58 See Hayden, ibid.: "Now almost entirely media personalities, Abbie and 
Jerry would spend much of their courtroom time analyzing coverage in the 
papers ... and even calculating which of the defendants was getting most of the 
media attention." 
Abbie Hoffman's understanding of the mass media, and of the "politics of 
constructivism," was a sophisticated one. Consider, for example, this excerpt 
from his direct testimony at trial: 
The term "myth" refers to an attitude, a subjective historical view of what is 
going on in society or in history past or history future. It is a subjective 
reality; the alliance between what actually happened and between thoughts 
and wonders and dreams and projections for the future is blurred together. 
For example, people's prejudices about what they see, since it is subjective, 
play a great role ... 
Every body participated in the Yippie myth and those people that 
participated most would be those people, newsmen and people in power 
who instantaneously can get on the news and hold press conferences and say 
whatever they want and have it absolutely reported. (Transcript at 375). 
320 RICHARD K. SHERWIN 
This strategy may also have helped to provoke federal district judge 
Julius Hoffman into playing the role of strict and partial authoritarian, a 
role that the Seventh Circuit court explicitly condemned on appeal, in 
an opinion that overturned the defendants' convictions. 59 
The Randall Dale Adams Trial 
As in the Chicago 7 trial, Errol Morris's portrayal of the trial of 
Randall Dale Adams in his film, The Thin Blue Line, used mass media 
representations to reach into stock cultural scripts, story lines, and 
character types in order to play upon people's beliefs and expectations. 
The film consists mostly of interviews with the individuals who 
participated in the trial - the judge, the defence lawyers, and the 
witnesses who testified, including the defendant. In this respect, it was 
ostensibly a film documentary. However, throughout the film Morris 
introduces scenarios that undercut the film's documentary status. For 
example, Morris stages and repeatedly replays (a la Rashomon60) the 
scene of the shooting. In addition to this as well as other dramatic re- 
enactments, all of which used actors instead of the real persons involved, 
Morris also overlays fictional film images on top of important film 
monologues spoken by the actual participants in the trial. 
For example, consider the film's treatment of two players in the 
actual trial, Mrs. Emily Miller, a self-described eyewitness to the 
shooting, and Judge Don Metcalfe, the judge who presided over the 
trial. First, here is an excerpt from Mrs. Miller's film monologue: 
MRS. MILLER: Yeah, when I was a kid I used to want to be a detective all 
the time because I used to watch all the detective shows on TV. 
When I was a kid, they used to show these movies with Boston Blackie, 
and he always had a woman with him. And I wanted to be the wife of a 
detective or be a detective, so I always watched detective stories. 
You know, it's always happening to me, everywhere I go, you know. 
Lots of times there's killings or anything, even around my house. 
Wherever. And I'm always looking or getting involved, you know. Find 
59 See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F. 2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972). 
60 Akira Kurosawa's film, Rashomon, depicts how the perception of reality is 
rooted in the perceiver's perspective. Kurosawa demonstrates the contingencies 
of interpretation by juxtaposing several re-enactments of a crime as seen from 
the vantage points of different eyewitnesses. Each version reflects the emotional 
make-up and character of the individual storyteller. 
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out who did it, or what's going on. 
I listen to people. And I'm always trying to decide who's lying, or who 
killed who before the police do; see ifI can beat them. Yeah.P! 
Notably, as we watch Mrs. Miller's talking head the scene abruptly 
shifts. We still hear her voice, but in place of Mrs. Miller we see images 
from a grade B, Boston Blackie television detective story. In the scene, 
we see a woman accompanying a gun-toting detective. She watches 
fearfully as he shoots the villain of the piece. The inference to be drawn 
from these stock images is clear. Morris is using this footage to 
comment on what Mrs. Miller is saying. The result is potent: we laugh. 
So this is Mrs. Miller's world, we say to ourselves. It is a mental reality 
lifted from the movies. 62 Clearly, Mrs. Miller is living in a world of 
fantasies. She can no longer tell the difference between reality and 
fiction. 63 In plain English, she's nuts. 
Now consider the following excerpt from the film monologue by 
Judge Metcalfe: 
JUDGE METCALFE: I grew up in a family where I was taught a great 
respect for law enforcement, and became acutely aware of the dangers that 
police officers go through, law enforcement officials go through, that I 
think much of the public is not really sensitive to. 
My father was an FBI man probably at the worst possible time to be in 
the FBI. It was from 1932 to 1935 in Chicago. My father had been sent 
to a lodge in Wisconsin. A car drove up with four men in it. They all had 
on sunglasses, hats. Dad says, "Well, he's in town." And with that, Dad 
said, the car drove off, he realized it could possibly have been Baby Face 
Nelson. 
My father told me that had he known it was Nelson, he would have 
61 See The Thin Blue Line (Third Floor Productions, 1988), transcript at 27 
(transcript on file with author). 
62 . The use of pop cultural reality to discredit a witness's credibility has been 
used effectively inside the courtroom. Consider, for example, a recently 
televised Scottish criminal trial in which the defence attorney discredited an 
eyewitness's account by suggesting to the jury that it sounded as if it came 
straight out of the classic Gary Cooper Western, High Noon. See The Trial 
(BBC Productions). (I am grateful to Suzanne Gibson for bringing to my 
attention this use of pop culture at trial.) 
63 And, of course, Morris' deeper ("postmodern") message is: neither can we. 
See John Fiske, Media Matters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1994), xxii: "Like popular culture, the law, too, has lost any sense of a clear 
boundary between the representation and the real, between the public opinion 
of a mediated society and the rational opinion of a courtroom." 
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pulled his gun, and that I would not be alive today- I wasn't born until 
several years later. 64 
Morris plays with Judge Metcalfe's monologue in the same way that he 
played with Mrs. Miller's. However, this time, instead of the stock cops 
and robbers scenario that introduced us to Mrs. Miller's weird "crime- 
stopper's" mental landscape, we now see unfurling before our eyes one of 
those stock "G-man" (or FBI agent) scenarios that most Americans 
absorbed, whether as kids or adults, from countless television shows and 
movies. And again, hearing Judge Mercalfe's self-serving monologue 
about his dad's glory days in the Chicago FBI has a similarly powerful 
effect. As with Mrs. Miller, we laugh. Only now it is not at the judge's 
craziness, but rather at his blatant bias which we see in the form of his 
intense romanticization of, and concomitant sympathy for, federal and 
state law enforcement agents. 
By triggering in our own heads the latent stereotypes, stock scripts 
and character types that appear to make up the judge's and Mrs. Miller's 
sense of reality, Morris reinforces one of the main points that his film is 
making, namely: that the crucial players in the Adams trial were utterly 
unreliable. We come to see that their sense of reality was made up of 
various and sundry false assumptions, distorted stereotypes, and other 
unreliable sources of knowledge about how things are in the world. 65 
Morris' documentary and subliminal docudrama techniques (i.e., his 
use of dramatic re-enactments and stock footage overlays) work. Most 
viewers of his film, including the Dallas Court officials who subsequent- 
ly decided to reopen Adams' s case, came away convinced. Adams is 
innocent. He was framed by a group of corrupt, crazed, ambitious, 
greedy, or otherwise biased characters who couldn't care less about 
outsider-types like Adams - a mere "drifter," in Judge Metcalfe's 
memorable phrase. 66 
By the time the film is over, we feel triumphant. It is the familiar 
rush that a good mystery story promises, and that it rewards us with in 
64 The Thin Blue Line, transcript at 22-23. 
65 The other point that Morris is making, a far more subversive one, is that it 
is by virtue of these stock images and story lines that all of us make up the 
worlds we live in. Judge Metcalfe and Mrs. Miller are not unique in this 
respect. It is this feature of Morris' film that makes the general public's, and 
most critics', treatment of the film as a "documentary" so oddly mistaken. 
66 The Thin Blue Line, transcript at 22. 
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the end. "Now we know the truth." And indeed, after the film's release, 
in the glare of intense media scrutiny, Adams's conviction was thrown 
out. After twelve and a half years in prison, Adams walked free. The 
innocent scapegoat of a corrupt Dallas frame-up. We feel good. Truth 
and justice have triumphed in the end. 
But it is not on that triumphant note that I want to leave things. 
I want to spoil the fun because I think there is a danger in such 
optimism. For one thing, it is naive. And in any event, it is beside the 
point. For even as we glory in Morris' expose of injustice, I think we are 
still caught up in - we are still unreflectively playing out - the 
particular truths that this particular story genre allows. 
With this in mind, consider one more excerpt from the film, this 
time from a monologue by yet another self-described eyewitness to the 
shooting, Michael Randell: 
MICHAEL RANDELL: I'm a salesman and you develop something like 
total recall. I don't forget places, and things, or streets, because it's a habit. 
Something I just picked up. I just stare intensely at people and try to figure 
them out. 
I was leaving the Plush Pub one night, driving a 1977 Cadillac, 
heading west on Hampton, I noticed a officer had two individuals pulled 
over to the curb in a blue some type of vehicle. Ir was ... it was a blue ... it 
was a blue ... I think ... it was a blue Ford. It was a blue something. 
The driver, I think, had long blonde hair and a mustache. And the 
other didn't have no hairs on his face. 
And at certain times of the night you do not go through there, because 
you're gonna get stopped. A person that's white going through that area at 
night - he's a sore thumb to stick out for the first reason. And if they 
don't lo.ok right, they're gonna stop you. That's ... that's bottom line. I 
could go through there; if I lean in my seat the wrong way, I'm getting 
pulled over. 
The officer, he walked up to the vehicle. He had walked up. His car 
was ... let me see ... I don't know if it was behind or in front, but I know he 
had him pulled over, and he was up to the car. Let me think. Yeah, he was 
up to the car. He had to have been up to the car. He was up to the car. 
I didn't see no bullet. I didn't see no gunfire. Because I went on.67 
First, consider why we know, even from this brief excerpt, why 
Michael Randell is a liar. The basis for our knowledge consists in its 
social constructedness and (as in Pulp Fiction) our simultaneous 
awareness of the construction. Begin with the familiar cultural maxim: 
67 Ibid., at 33-34. 
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everyone knows that inconsistency bespeaks falsity .68 Randell starts out by 
telling a personal myth, and we immediately see through it. He says, "I 
don't forget." But of course he does: "I noticed some type of vehicle ... 
it was ... it was a blue ... It was a blue something ... " 
We even seem to see how Randell goes about deceiving us, and 
perhaps even himself: "He was up to the car. Let me think. Yeah, he 
was up to the car. He had to have been up to the car. He was up to the 
" car. 
Second, we also see how Randell's identity and social status frame 
his sense of truth and justice. For one thing, Randell clearly is an 
outsider, subject to arbitrary police power: "They're gonna stop you ... 
That's the bottom line ... Ifl lean in my seat the wrong way I'm getting 
pulled over." . 
Finally, race is a significant factor in Randell's understanding of how 
the world works.: "A person that's white going through that area at 
night - [West Dallas, where the shooting occurred, is an all black 
neighbourhood] - he's a sore thumb ... They're gonna stop you ... " 
Thus, Randell's story comes to this: 
arbitrary police power rules; 
outsiders are targets; 
Adams, and his sixteen year old companion in the car at the 
time of the shooting, were bound to be stopped given who 
and where they were on the night in question. 
What Morris is doing here, and what he does throughout The Thin 
Blue Line, is show us how people's pre-existing beliefs and expectations 
shape the way they see and talk about the world. In other words, he is 
showing us how meanings are socially and culturally constructed. 
But Morris is also doing more. He is using our prejudices - we, the 
movie audience - to indict the prosecution, to show the state's frame- 
up of Randall Dale Adams. And to do that, we must be seduced by the 
story of the defence. 
It is an interesting thing. When we actually see how meanings are 
made, when we catch sight of the prejudices that were at work in the 
state's case against Adams, we are more prone to mistrust them, to 
condemn them as "distortion." Which is fine, except that in doing this 
we tend to forget the prejudices that make such a judgment possible in 
the first place. 
68 See Scheppele, "Just the Facts, Ma'am", supra n. 38, at 133. 
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So, with this insight in mind, let us take the next step and ask: what 
beliefs and expectations make Morris' expose possible? What if we were 
to see through Morris' story of the defence? If we spot the way it 
seduces will we then grow suspicious of the truths that it conjures in our 
minds? Will we then be tempted to seek out other truths, truths that 
Morris' story represses? 
Let's see. Allow me to tell you the mystifying, untold tale of homo- 
sexuality denied. Call it: the story that Morris left on the cutting room 
floor. Consider these details: 
27 year old Randall Dale Adams and 16 year old David 
Harris - perfect strangers until their chance meeting on a 
Dallas roadway - spend an entire day together; 
they drink beer together, smoke pot, hang out in a pool hall, 
go to a soft porn drive-in movie; 
Adams says he'll try to get Harris a job where Adams works; 
that night, when Adams asks his brother if young Harris can 
stay over at the motel where Adams and his brother are 
staying, the brother says he doesn't like that sort of thing. 
What sort of thing? 
After Adams' brother says no, do Harris and Adams drive together 
onto Inman Road? Were they parked by the roadside with the car lights 
off when a police officer approached their car? Wh~t did the investiga - 
ting officer see? Did Harris shoot because he had to violently suppress 
the meaning of a roadside homosexual encounter? Did Adams? Was 
killing the witness to that scene the only way to make it go away? The 
only way for Harris or Adams to repress a feared (or is it a real) 
homosexual identity? 
If believed, the story of Adams' and Harris' homosexuality invites us 
to mistrust the certainty that Morris' mystery expose induces. Was 
Adams the innocent victim that Morris portrays? Or was he an accom - 
plice to murder? Or perhaps even the murderer? 
We don't know. 
My point is this: it is only by breaking free of the beliefs and 
expectations that Morris' mystery-expose genre takes for granted that we 
can know that we don't know. Only when we spot and suspend the 
narrative necessity of a particular story can we entertain the possibility of 
other stories, and of other truths. 
I will sum up with this. In the story I counter-story dynamic of 
criminal trials, lawyers need to keep two meaning making strategies in 
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mind: (1) the strategy of narrative seduction (e.g., using such techniques as 
self-dramatization and mythification through mass media representa - 
tions), and (2) the strategy of disbelief (e.g., surfacing into the light of 
critical reflection the mind's genre-frozen assumptions - about stock 
story forms, scenarios, and character types - as well as its defences 
against unfamiliar or subjectively disturbing truths). 
The art and the craft of legal storytelling lie in the details of story 
and context. As legal scholars, that is where we should be looking. 
